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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY , 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
10395 
It would serve little purpose to state in this supporting 
Brief the facts underlying this Appeal. They are not in 
contest and are already set out in paragraph 1 of the ma-
jority opinion ::..nd in the appeal briefs of the parties. The 
full set of legal issues framed by the pleadings and pre-
sented in the Appeal has also been outlined in paragraph 
2 of the majority opinion and paragraph 1 of the dissent of 
the Chief Justice. They will not be again recited in this 
Brief, except as they may relate to the grounds for Appel-
lant's Petition for Rehearing. 
b 
This Brief will, accordingly, focus upon the particular 
grounds, defined in the foregoing Petition, upon which 
ISLAND RANCHING COMP ANY urges that a rehearing 
of the case on its merits be ordered and undertaken by the 
Court. 
GROUND I. 
Grant of Em·inent Domain Power Issue 
a. THE MAJORITY OPINION, IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT GSLA HAS BEEN GRANTED THE 
POWER TO CONDEMN ANTELOPE ISLAND, 
HAS ERRONEOUSLY IGNORED THE RULE 
OF CONSTRUCTION THAT THE EMINENT 
DOMAIN POWER IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE PARTY SEEKING ITS EX-
ERCISE. 
The eminent domain power is not granted when 
its existence is dependent upon implied construc-
tion. 
In the ninety years this Court has decided controver-
sies, it has not faced a more fundamental and substantial 
question than the "grant of eminent domain power" issue 
presented in this Appeal. Only eight times in that ninety· 
year span has a question of similar import been raised. 1 
1 Bertagno[e V. Baker. supra; Barnes V. Wade, 90 Utah l, 58 P. 2d 297 
1936); Utah Copper Co. V. Stephen Hayes Estate, 83 Utah 545, 31 
P. 2d 624 (1934); Town of Perry V. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 
2d 343 (1933); Alcorn V. Reading, 66 l.rtah 509, 243 Pac. 922 
(1926); Mone/air Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co .. 
53 Utah 413, 174 Pac. 172 (1918); Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 390, 168 Pac. 86 (1917): Tanner V. Prouo 
Bench Canal f5 Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911). 
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The last time was sixteen years ago in Bertagnole v. Baker, 
et al., 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950). With footings 
cemented in basic concepts of constitutional law, the issue 
centers upon the relationship of government to the property 
rights of the citizen. Its consideration and resolution in 
this case, by definition, will affect the posture of ninety 
years of judicial precedent in this State as to that relation-
ship. 
is: 
Generically, the question is: 
To meet the demands of constitutional due process 
of law, what is the character of legislative power that 
must be granted to an administrative agency in order 
for it to take, by eminent domain, a man's property 
against his will ? 
The issue presented, as applied to the facts of this case, 
Is the GSLA law, in providing that the property 
of Island Ranching Company shall be acquired by 
"donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful 
means" a constitutionally adequate grant of the emi-
nent domain power when measured by the require-
ments that the legislative delegation be specific, and 
the guarantee of the citizen that his property shall not 
be "taken" without due process of law? 
The keys to this question lie in the roots and morals 
of our society, and involve the very essence of the demo-
cratic order as we now know it. They have been encased in 
the annals of legislative thought and the inviolate core of 
judicial opinion in this country for almost two centuries of 
time. The principle fashioned of these times is simple: A 
man's property shall not be taken from him against his 
will by the government, unless through the legislative ex-
ercise of the power of eminent domain. There is an equally 
simple corollary : The eminent domain power shall not be 
exercised by a government agency of limited jurisdiction 
unless it is in 8trict compliance w Eth a plain and unequiv-
cal statutory grant. This principle and its corollary have 
their origin in the beginnings of this country. "The pres-
ervation of property is a primary object of the social com-
pact," wrote the United States Supreme Court in Van-
H orne' s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 ( 1795). "Property 
must be secured," wrote John Adams, "or liberty cannot 
exist." 2 And Justice Field in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 
U. S. 700 (1879) said: 
"All history shows that rights of person are un-
safe where property is unsecure. Protection to one 
goes with protection to the other; and there can be 
neither prosperity nor progress where this founda-
tion of all just government is unsettled." 
And so it was that the right to hold property against 
unlawful government expropriation was secured in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Section 7 of Article 1, Constitution of 
Utah: 
"No person should be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law." 
2 The Works of John Ac!ims, Vol. 6, p. 280 (C. F. Adams, Ed. 1851) 
--
To insure that the right to hold property free of un-
authorized government action is afforded co-existent pro-
tection with the guaranties of life and liberty under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts have been consistent in their 
vigil that in determining whether the eminent domain 
power has been granted to an administrative agency, it is 
presumptively construed strictly against the party in quest 
of its exercise, and where the power can be made out only 
through argument, construction, or implication (i.e., where 
it is not delegated as to particular property in the clearest 
of language) the attempt<:d exercise will be denied. The 
Supreme Court of Washington, in State of Washington v. 
Superior Court, et al., 19 Wash. 2d 791, 144 P. 2d 916, 920 
( 1944) , states the rule : 
"The right to exercise the power of eminent 
domain is one of the highest powers exercised by 
the sovereign. This right will not be implied, nor 
will it be extended beyond express statutory author-
ity. The law is clearly stated in 1 Lewis on Eminent 
Domain, 3d Ed., p. 679, §371, as follows: 'The exer-
cise of the power being against common right, it 
cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubt-
ful language, but must be given in express terms or 
by necessary implication. When the right to exer-
cise the power can only be made out by argument 
and inference, it does not exist. "There must be no 
effort to prove the existence of such high corporate 
right, else it is in doubt, and, if so, the state has 
not granted it."'" (Emphasis added.) 
The great Justice Wolfe was fully aware of this card-
inal rule when he wrote for a unanimous court in Bertag-
nole v. Baker, et al., 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950): 
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"The right of eminent domain, being in deroga-
tion of the rights of individual ownership in prop-
erty, has been strictly construed by the courts so 
that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the 
use and enjoyment of his property. (Citing author-
ities * * *" (P. 628 of 215 P. 2d.) 
Although the Salt Lake City Board of Education, in 
Bertagnole, made its showing that the attempted condem-
nation was for a school use, that public necessity existed, 
and that there was a general legislative grant of eminent 
domain power, it was denied the power to condemn outside 
of its boundaries because the statute did not specifically 
authorize such: 
"Thus it follows that the authority contended 
for by the School Board not having been expressly 
given and not being clearly inferable from our stat-
utes, must be denied it. Under the authorities on 
this subject, power cannot be derived frorn the 
doubtful inf er enc es which support the School 
Board's claim of authority." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Bertagnole case is the last word spoken by this 
Court on the constitutional necessity of a clear, precise and 
unequivocal statutory grant of the eminent domain power 
to condemn particular property. The last word, that is, 
until the majority opinion in this case. That opinion is 
written as though Bertagnole v. Baker had never been de-
cided, 3 as though the strong precedent of this Court and 
the legions of cases throughout the Country which affirm 
Bertagnole, did not exist. 
a The main opinion does not cite or refer to the Bcrtagnole case in the two 
paragraphs it devotes to the eminent domain issue. 
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The majority opinion, while quick to refer to the pre-
sumption favoring the constitutionality of legislative enact-
ments in discussing other issues in the case, fails totally to 
note or even observe the presumption that a grant of emi-
nent domain is strictly construed against the condemnor 
and that it will not be upheld where its validity is in doubt 
or sustained only through argument. It treats the eminent 
domain question in this case as one of typical statutory 
construction, \Yithout apparent consideration of the long-
established respect for the basic and natural right of man 
to own and hold property as against an unauthorized gov-
ernment expropriation. The opinion gives no attention to 
the claims of Appellant that the attempted "taking" is vio-
lative of the "property" section of the Due Process Clause 
of both Federal and State Constitutions, and as stated, it 
completely ignores the time-honored presumption of strict 
construction against the legislative grant of eminent do-
main. 
We view this omission in the majority opinion as criti-
cal in this Petition for Rehearing. This is not a case 
where Appellant simply is out of harmony with the conclu-
sion of the majority opinion. Rather, it is a case where 
the main opinion has overlooked, ignored, or failed to con-
sider a substantive, material and vital point of the Appeal. 
Such omission makes it proper that this case be re-
heard and decided, taking stock of the property, due pro-
cess and construction arguments raised in the Appeal and 
re-urged in this Petition. Utah Savings & Loan Assn. V. 
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Mecham, 12 U. 2d 335, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961); Brown v. 
Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 Pac. 573 (1886). 
b. THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE MA-
JORITY OPINION TO THE PHRASE "BY DO-
NATION, PURCHASE AGREEMENT, LEASE 
OR OTHER LAWFUL MEANS" IN THE STAT-
UTE, IN HOLDING THAT THE SAME BE-
STOWS THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER AS 
TO ANTELOPE ISLAND, IS ERRONEOUS, 
WI T H 0 UT JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, AND 
FAILS TO CONSIDER A MATERIAL ELE-
MENT. 
The majority opinion acknowledges that the authority 
of Plaintiff to condemn Antelope Island stems from 65-8-
6 ( 10), which provides in part: 
"The authority is authorized to take any steps 
that are necessary to secure such part of Antelope 
Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease, or 
other lawful means * * * ." 
This is the only section of the Law wherein the man-
ner of acquiring Antelope Island is specified by the Legis-
lature. Clearly, the means of acquisition set out therein 
are voluntary and exclusive of eminent domain. Donation, 
purchase agreement and lease all require the consent of the 
13 
Island owner. To gain its meaning of the phrase "or other 
lawful means" in Section (10), the majority opinion 
chooses not to ref er to two principles of statutory construc-
tion, ejusdem generis and expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius, both of which restrict the mode of acquiring Antel-
ope Island to consensual and non-forceful means. Instead 
it prefers to rely on a different Section, 65-8-6 (1) 4 which 
delineates the manner of acquiring unspecified property by 
Plaintiff. 
From this process, the majority opinion concludes that 
it is "clearly apparent" that the eminent domain power was 
delegated as to Antelope Island because without the power, 
"it is obvious that the purposes of the act could not be car-
ried out". (Majority Opn. P. 3, Para. 3). 
To begin 'vith, it is error to interpret a Statute in the 
context of what the Legislature should obviously have done 
to implement and make effective the Law. The question is, 
rather, what did the Legislature actually say on the matter. 
The majority opinion, in rejecting the rule of construc-
tion, ejusdem generis, does an about face from the position 
taken by this Court just six months ago in State Land 
Board v. State Dept. of Fish and Game, 17 U. 2d 237, 408 
P. 2d 707 (Dec. 1965). In that case, the Court was called 
upon to determine whether a statute which reserved "coal 
and other minerals", included sand and gravel. This Court 
held that under the "universally recognized rule" of ejusdem 
4 This Section provides that eminent domain may be employed to acquire 
non-specific real property. It makes no mention, however, of Antelope 
Island, as does 65-8-6 (10). 
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generis, a general term following a specific term is 
interpreted to mean things of like kind or character. Ergo, 
sand and gravel, although otherwise a mineral, were not 
encompassed within the statutory phrase "coal and other 
minerals". The stand taken in the Land Board case is clear 
precedent for the same approach in the case at bar. The 
application of ejusdem generis together with the presump-
tion of strict construction against stci.tutes allegedly grant-
ing the power of eminent domain (the latter, the main 
opinion ignores altogether), would dictate a result dras-
tically different from that reached by the majority opinion 
in this case. And that is without referring at all to the 
principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which this 
Court has seen fit to adopt in times past. 5 
The majority opinion makes a break with judicial 
precedent that is patently in error when it looks to the 
general clause 65-8-6 ( 1) (granting eminent domain as to 
non-particular property) as controlling the specific clause 
in 65-8-6 (10), which instructs as to the manner of acquir-
ing Antelope Island. Precedent and the warranted ration-
ale support the holding that the special clause ("donation, 
purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means") in its 
independent and particular reference to Antelope Island, 
controls and is an exception to the _general clause which 
makes no reference to the Island. For as this Court said 
in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209 
Pac. 207 ( 1922) : 
5 Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 P. Zd 1 
(1936). 
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"Further, it is an elementary doctrine that, 
where two statutes treat of the same subject-matter, 
the one general and the other special in its provi-
sions, the special provision controls the general." 
Although the majority opinion turns away the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, it significantly fails to discuss or even 
mention the principle that where two sections of a statute 
treat the same subject matter. one of general and the other 
of special import, the special controls the general. 
But there is another material element of this issue 
which the majority opinion fails to pass upon. If, as the 
main opinion concludes, the legislative intent was that the 
special means of acquiring Antelope Island in 65-8-6 ( 10) 
"donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful 
means" refers to and is controlled by the general grant in 
65-8-6 (1), why then was the special means as to Antelope 
Island inserted in subsection ( 10) at all? In such event, 
why didn't the Legislature merely rely upon the general 
clause in subsection (1) since that covers adequately the 
eminent domain power. Both questions are relevant, well-
taken, and follow logically in response to the position an-
nounced by the main opinion. The Legislature provides its 
own answer to these questions which answer is inconsistent 
with the majority opinion. After finishing the general clause 
as to non-specific property, it went on to spell out the pre-
cise manner in which Antelope Island was to be acquired, to 
the precise exclusion of the eminent domain power. Unless 
We assume that the Legislature was involved in a hand-
writing exercise, that it did not know what it was doing, 
and that it did not mean what it said, the ordinary meaning 
and intent of 65-8-6 ( 10) as to Antelope Island must be 
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given effect. The majority opinion has failed to treat this 
question or to supply an answer to it. 
It should consider the question by granting a rehear-
ing of the eminent domain issue on its merits. 
GROUND II. 
Territorial Lim,itaM.on Issue 
THE MA.TORITY OPINION, TO DETERMINE 
AND FIND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF 
GSLA, HAS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED EX-
CLUSIVELY UPON THE TITLE TO THE GSLA 
LAW RATHER THAN THE ENACTED LAW 
ITSELF. 
The majority opinion finds that the Great Salt Lake 
and its environs is the territorial boundary of the Great 
Salt Lake Authority: 
"* * * Applying that principle here leaves 
no doubt that the phrase, 'Great Salt Lake and its 
environs,' even though appearing in sections not 
specifically delineating boundaries, was intended to 
describe the area over which Plaintiff was to have 
jurisdiction. * * *" (Emphasis ours) Major-
ity Opn., p. 1. 
The search for authority to support this finding is not 
easy. Under any rule of statutory construction, including 
in pari materia which the majority opinion invokes, the 
Statute does not yield such result. No section of the Stat-
ute declares the territorial limitation of Plaintiff to be "the 
Great Salt Lake and its environs." Nor does the Statute 
when considered in its entirety "so as to produce an har-
monious whole and ... give effect to the intent and purpose 
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to be devined from the entire act," define the boundaries 
as such. (Quotation from Majority Opn. p. 1, para. 4). 
The only possible basis for the majority opinion's 
finding is the assumption that the Legislature, in its great 
wisdom, must have intended that some boundary line be 
established, and if the term "Great Salt Lake and its en-
virons" in the Statute is not grasped as the boundary line, 
there is nothing else in the enacted Law which remotely 
lends itself to a territorial description. In other words, the 
gist of the main opinion's argument is that while the "Great 
Salt Lake and its environs" is not a good boundary defini-
tion, it is the closest the Act comes to such a definition, 
and because of the presumption favoring constitutionality6 , 
close is better than nothing at all. 
The argument, the same as the State made in the Ap-
peal, is fallacious. Close has never been nor is it now, a 
satisfactory test when this Court has before it for constitu-
tional interpretation the geographical boundaries of an 
agency of limited jurisdiction. The natural right of man 
to hold property which may or may not be affected by that 
limited jurisdiction is at stake in such interpretation. The 
assumption that the Legislature must have intended a terri-
torial boundary in the Statute is erroneous and unfounded 
both in law and the facts of this case. The Statute, itself, 
gives every evidence of the fact that the territorial boundary 
6 The Majority Opinion prefaces its discussion of the constitutional issues 
in this case with the statement that the Court will strike down an act 
with reluctance and only where clearly necessary and that the act will be 
construed as constitutional whenever reasonable. P. 1, para. 3 of Majority 
Opn. 
was entirely omitted by the Legislature. The omission 
may have been unintentional, but the hard fact is nonethe-
less, that no boundary was described. 
The main opinion suggests that this Defendant ack-
nowledges that the Statute describes the boundary as the 
"Lake and its environs" and argues that the term is merely 
indefinite and uncertain. (Majority Opn., p. 1, para. 4). 
This statement does not represent the position of ISLAND 
RANCHING COMP ANY in this Appeal. Our position has 
been and is now, that the law is utterly void of a declara-
tion of territorial boundaries. There is no line of limita-
tion within which GSLA jurisdiction is fixed. Appellant 
assessed in its appeal brief the term "Great Salt Lake and 
its environs" as a boundary definition, only because of the 
argument advanced by the State in that regard before the 
trial court. To conclude that the established boundary is 
the "Lake and its environs" is not to construe the Statute. 
It is to improvise upon and enlarge it. 
Nevertheless, the main opinion, having found that the 
boundary is the "Great Salt Lake and its environs," takes 
note that the meaning of the term gives "rise to some un-
certainty." (Majority Opn., p. 2, line 3). There can be no 
quarrel with that observation. The term, in the very na-
ture of things, is not susceptible to objective measurement. 
One does as well by saying the boundary is the "Great Salt 
Lake and other reasonable areas". To overcome this ob-
scurity, the main opinion turns to the title of the Statute, 
which in turn refers to the "meander line established by 
the United States Surveyer General." The legal relevancy 
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of the title and the judicial framework within which the 
title is to be examined is laid down preliminarily in the 
main opinion : 
"* * * w h . e are aware t at m many deci-
sions, including our own, it has been stated that the 
title is not part of the act. This is true in the sense 
that it is not integrated into the operating portion 
of the legislation; and that it will not be permitted 
to contradict nor defeat a plainly expressed intent; 
nor can it be used to create an ambiguity or uncer-
tainty when the language of the body of the act is 
clear. But where such clarity is lacking, it is per-
missible to look to the title of the enactment to shed 
light on and clarify the meaning." Majority Opn., 
p. 2, para. 1. 
The meaning of this statement is plain - the title to 
a law has no statutory rank, it cannot be employed as such, 
and it will not be permitted to introduce into a statute a 
substantive factor not already a part of the enactment. 
Having thus recorded the prevailing rule of law, the 
majority opinion proceeds to immediately violate it by em-
ploying the title in such manner that it, and not the Statute, 
fixes the jurisdictional boundary of the Great Salt Lake 
Authority. Whereas, the title refers to "the meander line 
established by the ... Surveyer General", it is crystal clear 
from the Statute that there is no correlation, association, 
nor relationship whatsoever, between the meander line and 
the "Great Salt Lake and its environs." The main opinion 
does not refer to one section of the Statute wherein the 
two terms would begin to complement each other. In the 
only section of the Statute (65-8-6(8)) in which the "me-
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ander line" phrase is used, the term "Great Salt Lake and 
its environs" is also found. It is manifest from that section 
that the two terms are not interchangeable, that they do 
not speak of the same area, and that the meander line does 
not amplify or explain the meaning of the Great Salt Lake 
and its environs. They are at separate stations on the 
spectrum with no connecting linkage. 
There is only one reason why, to use the language of 
the main opinion, the meander line in the title "gives a 
sufficiently clear and satisfactory indication of what is 
meant by the 'Great Salt Lake and its environs'". (Major-
ity Opn., p. 2, para. 1) . That is because the main opinion 
says so. The upshot of this judicial innovation is that the 
title, not the Statute, supplies and is the territorial bound-
ary, since it carries the only term that is reasonably the 
subject of ascertainment. Such result is not only against 
the sound precedent of this Court; it permits an otherwise 
invalid statute to be upheld by furnishing to it a constitu-
tional requirement from a source outside of the enactment. 
A rehearing should be granted to correct this erron· 
eous holding. 
GROUND III. 
Delegation of Legislat1".ve Authority Issue 
THE MAJORITY OPINION, IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE GSLA LA Vv' IS NOT UN CONSTI-
TUTION AL BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF 
LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS, HAS TOTALLY 
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FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE LAW 
DOES NOT SPECIFY OR DELEGATE PER-
FORMANCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE OBJEC-
TIVES TO BE ACHIEVED. 
In discussing this issue, the majority opinion states: 
"We off er no defense of the Act as a model of 
legislative draftsmanship." 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds that the Act 
contains an adequate constitutional basis, against the at-
tack that it is vague, ambiguous, and lacks legislative ob-
jectives, said basis being that the agency is required to 
adopt reasonable regulations, that it is prohibited from 
lending the credit of the State to private purposes, that it 
exercise the condemnation power in accordance with the 
general law, and that: 
"The Authority shall have power to determine 
the policies and develop the program best desig-
nated to accomplish the objectives and purposes set 
out in this Act." 65-8-4. 
In so concluding, the majority opinion has by-passed 
or failed to consider the leading point in this issue. That 
is, that the Act is in default in stating what the legislative 
objectives of the Statute are. It leaves to the administra-
tive body not ouly the power to determine what policies are 
best designed to accomplish an objective, but it leaves as 
well the determination of the objective.1 It is in this calling 
1 65-8-6 (5) is not, as the main opinion would indicate, declarative of the 
legislative objective. It simply suggests one of several admini.strative poli-
cies which the agency may or may not employ to accomplish an unde-
termined legislativ~ objective. 
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that the Law is constitutionally deficient. To the agency 
is left the decision of what is to be accomplished and the 
method of accomplishment. The latter is legally permis-
sible; the former constitutes an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power. This Court has heretofore placed the 
issue at rest: 
"That the legislature may not surrender or 
delegate its legislative power is elemental ... the 
legislature must clearly mark the course to be pur-
sued and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve 
as guide posts to enable the officer to carry out not 
his own will or judgment but that of the legislature." 
Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 
99 P. 2d 1 (1940). 
The Act standing by itself is of slim and frail exist-
ence. When it is measured, however, in the light of Ap-
pellant's constitutional guarantee to due process of law and 
its right to statutory notice of how its property will be 
affected, altered, or disrupted by action of the administra-
tive agency, the Statute is intolerable and should be stricken 
down. 
A rehearing of this issue by the Court should be or-
dered. 
GROUND IV & CONCLUSION 
Due Process of Law Issue 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
INFIRMITIES OF THE STATUTE, AS MADE 
OPERATIVE AGAINST THE OWNER OF 
ANTELOPE ISLAND BY THE MAJORITY 
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OPINION, VIOLATES THE GUARANTEES OF 
APPELLANT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The handwriting is clear in this case, as the Statute 
is not, that the treatment accorded by the majority opinion 
to the three issues raised in the Appeal and urged in this 
Petition for Rehearing, operate to deprive Appellant of its 
property, held for better than eighty years, without due 
process of law. 
The great Ordinance of the 14th Amendment of the 
National Constitution and Section 7 of Article I of the Utah 
Charter, declaring that: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law,'' 
makes it mandB-tory that in the field of eminent domain, a 
statute appear in black and white and that we know of its 
import beyond equivocatior.. and reasonable argument. The 
very freedom of man and our social order hang in the bal-
ance of that mandate. If private property can be expropri-
ated by a government agency under the auspices of an am-
biguous and argumentative statute, democracy, as well as 
this individual Appellant, is the loser. 
The whole trouble with the majority opinion m the 
major issues set forth in this Petition is that the issue is 
determined no:; upon the basis of what the legislature, in 
fact, did, but upon what the majority opinion believes it 
should have done. Admittedly, the Statute creates a maze 
of uncertainty, ambiguity and argument. To sustain the 
grant of eminent domain power and uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Law, the majority opinion is required to em-
ploy construction technique upon technique, with the result 
dependent upon that technique which is utilized and that 
which is discarded. 
The time has come for this Court to say to the Legis-
lature that if it is going to enact laws which substantially 
affect the lives and propel ty of man in this day, it will 
have to state jts intentions clearly and unequivocally, so 
that men of ordinary intellect can understand its meaning. 
And further, if it does not, and if it passes legislation 
wherein the eminent domain power as to a landowner's 
property is placed in doubt, the statute will be stricken 
down and the condemnation power will be denied. 
The failure of the majority opinion to consider the 
factors set out in the accompanying Petition for Rehearing 
and this Brief, are material to and dispositive of this case. 
To consider those factors and accord Appellant due process 
of law, a rehearing of the case should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE W. LATIMER, 
and 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
of 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
